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Abstract: We examine corporate donations to political candidates for federal offices in the
United States from 1991 to 2004. Firms that donate have operating characteristics consistent with
the existence of a free cash flow problem, and donations are negatively correlated with returns. A
$10,000 increase in donations is associated with a reduction in annual excess returns of 7.4 basis
points. Worse corporate governance is associated with larger donations. Even after controlling for
corporate governance, donations are associated with lower returns. Donating firms engage in more
acquisitions and their acquisitions have significantly lower cumulative abnormal announcement
returns than non-donating firms. We find virtually no support for the hypothesis that donations
represent an investment in political capital. Instead, political donations are symptomatic of agency
problems within firms. Our results are particularly useful in light of the Citizens United ruling,
which is likely to greatly increase the use of corporate funds for political donations.
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Why do companies make donations to political parties and to candidates for 
political office? Companies do not have political preferences per se. They may, 
however, have an economic interest in various legislative actions, regulatory 
decisions, or other political outcomes. Thus, one reason why companies may 
donate is to influence the political process in ways that improve firm 
performance. An alternative reason is that, while companies do not have political 
preferences, their managers do. In this view, political donations need not be 
associated with firm performance and in fact, may damage firm returns as they 
represent a form of perquisites consumption for the firm’s managers. This form of 
perquisites consumption is often not transparent or visible to shareholders, and 
can indicate wider agency problems at the firm.  
While these two possibilities for why firms donate are not mutually 
exclusive, they do have very different implications for the firm and its 
shareholders. Under the first view, donations are an investment in political capital 
that should, in expectation, generate positive returns for the firm. Under the 
second view, donations are symptomatic of an agency problem that should lower 
returns for the firm. We examine which of these views more accurately 
characterizes political donations in the United States.  
We use comprehensive data on corporate political donations from the 
Center for Responsive Politics. Our data span from 1991 to 2004 and include the 
four main types of political donations: political action committee (PAC) 
donations, donations by individuals affiliated with a company, soft money 
donations, and donations to 527 Committees. We focus specifically on donations 
made directly from corporate funds—soft money donations and donations to 527 
Committees. Of all the publicly-traded firms, only 11.27% or 1,381 firms donated 
directly from corporate funds during our sample period. Our focus on donations 
made from corporate funds is particularly salient in the wake of the Supreme 
Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, which 
essentially eliminates restrictions on the use of corporate funds in elections. We 
discuss this in greater detail in Section 2. 
We find that firms that donate directly from corporate funds have 
operating characteristics consistent with the firms facing a free cash flow 
problem—they are large, slowly-growing firms that have more free cash flow, yet 
engage in less R&D and investment spending. We also find that donations are 
negatively correlated with future excess returns. An increase in soft money and 
527 Committee donations of $10,000 is associated with a reduction in excess 
returns of 7.4 basis points in the following year. Similar to Yermack’s (2006) 
results for the personal use of corporate aircraft by CEOs, this reduction in 
shareholder value far outstrips the dollar value of the donations. This suggests that 
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political donations may be a useful window into the presence of wider agency 
problems within firms. To address endogeneity concerns, we instrument for 
donations and find similar negative associations between donations and returns. 
Third, we find that better corporate governance (smaller boards, CEOs 
who are not also chairman of their board, less abnormal CEO compensation, 
larger block ownership, and larger institutional ownership) is associated with 
smaller donations. However, even after we control for corporate governance, we 
continue to find a negative association between donations and excess returns. 
Thus, while better governance may attenuate donations, the negative association 
between donations and excess returns is not wholly attributable to an omitted 
governance effect. Fourth, we find that firms that make political donations engage 
in more acquisitions than do non-donating firms. Further, donating firms’ 
acquisitions have significantly lower cumulative abnormal announcement returns 
than do non-donating firms’ acquisitions.  
We also examine whether donations to the winning party in an election 
lead to higher event-study returns. We find positive one-day abnormal returns to 
donating to the winning party in presidential and congressional election years. 
This is consistent with the prior literature and has been viewed as supporting the 
investment hypothesis. For longer-horizon returns, we find no evidence of a 
positive effect of donating to winners in either presidential or congressional 
elections. Importantly, we generally find that donating to either winners or losers 
is associated with worse returns than not donating at all. This provides us with a 
direct test of the two hypotheses, and our findings are consistent with the agency 
hypothesis but hard to reconcile with the investment hypothesis.  
We also consider the possibility that politicians may do favors for firms 
and then firms may donate to politicians. If so, a positive effect of political favors 
on firm returns may occur prior to the donations. To address this, we examine 
returns for firms that start donating when there is a shift in political control, since 
these firms are unlikely to be donating in response to past favors. In this case, we 
still find a strong negative association between firm returns and initiating 
donations to a party that wins political control. Thus, our results cannot simply be 
driven by firms choosing to donate after political favors are bestowed. In addition, 
we examine a subsample of companies in industries that receive government 
contracts since, for these companies, donations are more likely to be an 
investment in political capital. We do not find evidence of the hypothesized 
positive association between donations and returns. 
Overall, we find only limited support for the hypothesis that political 
donations directly from corporate funds represent an investment in political 
capital. Taken together, our results suggest that political donations are reflective 
of an agency problem. Given the magnitude of the destruction of shareholder 
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value that we document, it is more plausible that corporate political donations are 
symptomatic of wider agency problems in the firm. 
The existing literature–which we review in the next section–has largely 
focused on short-term event studies that examine whether corporate political 
connections or donations are valuable. While event studies can detect changes in 
firm value attributable to certain events (e.g., elections), they do not measure 
potential offsetting costs due to potential agency problems from the donations 
themselves. In contrast, we test two competing hypotheses—donations as 
reflective of an agency problem between managers and shareholders versus 
donations as an investment in political capital. In order to do so, our approach 
differs along three dimensions.  
First, we use the direct monetary amount of donations, which allows us to 
test the two competing hypotheses, since donations can either be an investment or 
a measure of perquisites consumption. Second, our focus on soft money donations 
and 527 Committee donations, which come directly from corporate resources, 
eliminates concerns that PAC donations are only an indirect form of corporate 
donations that cannot be attributed to agency concerns. Third, we study long-
horizon returns, which help us to formally distinguish between the agency and 
investment hypotheses. Our focus on stock returns is appropriate given that 
political donations over our sample period are not disclosed in a transparent or 
timely fashion to shareholders, and are therefore likely to be capitalized into stock 
prices only slowly over time. 
 
1. Literature Review and Experimental Design 
 
This paper contributes to a growing literature that looks at the intersection of 
politics and finance. Several recent papers present event studies examining the 
effects of the 2000 U.S. presidential elections on companies aligned with 
Republicans or Democrats, including Knight (2006), Goldman, Rocholl and So 
(2009), Shon (2010), and Jayachandran (2006). In general, these papers find that 
good (bad) news for Republicans is associated with a positive (negative) stock 
price reaction for Republican-leaning firms and a negative (positive) stock price 
reaction for Democratic-leaning firms. In contrast to our study, these papers 
necessarily focus on short-run returns, small samples, and isolated events. Cooper, 
Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) find evidence of a positive effect of donations on 
firm value and we discuss their results in greater detail in Section 4.  
By contrast, other studies document the ineffectiveness of campaign 
donations as a form of gaining influence or buying favorable policies. 
Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003) show that when one controls for 
unobserved constituent and legislator effects, there is little relationship between 
money and legislator votes. Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ueda (2004) examine the 
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excess returns of firms that give large amounts of soft money and firms that give 
no soft money, and changes in those excess returns around five key events in the 
approval of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. They find no 
noticeable effect on the valuation of Fortune 500 firms that give large amounts of 
soft money relative to the firms that give no soft money. 
We note that much of the prior literature uses short-term event studies to 
examine the effect of political donations on firm returns. We examine long-term 
(one-year) stock returns instead of short-horizon stock returns for three reasons. 
First, a short-run event study around an election does not allow us to detect an 
agency motive for donations. If political donations are a private benefit for 
managers, then the election outcome is not informative one way or another for 
shareholders. In this case, an agency motive would be entirely consistent with the 
results in Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder (2003), and Ansolabehere, 
Snyder and Ueda (2004) that show no immediate benefits from donations.  
Second, firms that do not donate are generally left out in the election event 
studies of donations to winners and losers.1 However, an examination of non-
donors provides valuable information about the motives for donation. As we 
noted before, many companies choose not to donate, presumably because the 
costs of donating exceed the benefits. Understanding the determinants of 
corporate donations helps us distinguish whether donations are related to 
shareholder value creation or to the management’s private benefits.  
Third, the short event window of election outcome announcements does 
not allow us to fully examine the investment value of corporate political 
donations. If corporate political donations are made as an investment on behalf of 
shareholders, then the investment value should be incorporated into stock prices 
as the investment outcomes are realized (or expected to be realized). The 
probability of these favorable outcomes may increase at the time of the election, 
but are likely to increase much more over time as the legislative process 
unfolds—as favorable legislation moves through committees, the House, and the 
Senate. Since those outcomes take a substantial amount of time to be realized, and 
there is still a high degree of uncertainty about those outcomes at the time of the 
election, long-term stock performance appears to be a better measure of the 
investment value of corporate political donations than the short-term stock returns 
following an election. Of course, there is also a cost to using long-term stock 
performance in that long-term stock returns are noisier than event-horizon returns. 
Later in the paper, we also examine the one-day announcement return associated 
with the election outcome for completeness. 
A second strand of the literature argues that political connections positively 
influence firm performance.2 Other research, however, documents that corporate 
                                                 
1 An exception is Ansolabehere, Snyder and Ueda (2004) 
2 See for example Fisman (2001) and Faccio (2006). 
4
Business and Politics, Vol. 14 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 5/2/12 5:08 AM
 
 
political connections are costly to the firm due to rent-seeking by politicians.3 
Politically connected firms show low industry-adjusted financial performance, 
labor capital ratios, and R&D spending relative to other firms of the same age and 
size. Our results for US firms that donate to politicians are consistent with the 
results of the studies that find negative effects of political connections on firm 
performance, but we emphasize a different mechanism. We show that political 
donations are associated with and indicative of conflicts between shareholders and 
managers. Our focus on agency problems within firms is distinct from but also 
complementary to rent-seeking by politicians. We also note that political 
connections (personal ties between politicians and corporate managers or 
corporations) are separate from political donations (payments from corporations 
to politicians). While political connections represent long-term relationships, 
political donations tend to be transactional and short-term, and vary over time and 




Corporations may be affiliated with giving money to political parties and 
candidates through four different channels: donations to Political Action 
Committees (PACs), donations from individuals who list the corporation as their 
employer, soft money donations, and donations to 527 groups. PACs solicit 
donations from employees, aggregate the funds, and then make donations to 
candidates and parties. Although the PAC is set up by the company, its funds 
come from employee donations, not company resources. Individual donations 
come directly from individuals, who are asked to disclose their employer when 
they make donations in excess of $200 (donations smaller than $200 are not 
tracked). PAC and individual donations need not reflect the preferences of either 
the firm’s shareholders or its managers—they may simply reflect the preferences 
of the individual making the donations. 
Soft money donations are unlimited campaign donations to the national 
parties for party-building activities such as get-out-the-vote drives and non-party 
specific advertising. Soft money donations are made directly by the company and 
its officers using company funds. Soft money donations were banned as a result of 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act as of November 6, 2002, but were an 
important means of political giving throughout all but the last election cycle of 
our sample period. After soft money was banned, direct donations from corporate 
funds switched to 527 groups. These are tax-exempt organizations under section 
527 of the Internal Revenue Code and they exist to raise money for political 
activities like voter mobilization efforts and issue advocacy. These groups became 
                                                 
3 See Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung (2000) for Canada; Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) for China; 
and Bertrand et al. (2005) for France. 
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more important after the abandonment of soft money donations, which is apparent 
from Table 1. 
On January 21, 2010, the United States Supreme Court effectively struck 
down the ban on soft money donations from the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
in its decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. The Supreme 
Court held that corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in elections 
cannot be limited under the First Amendment. While the decision does not 
address the ban on direct donations from corporations to candidates, the decision 
allows corporate funding of broadcasts that independently support or oppose 
candidates and positions. As a result, corporations are essentially unlimited in the 
amount that they can spend on elections going forward. 
In this study we primarily report results for soft money and 527 
Committee donations. However, our results are quite similar if we also include 
individual and PAC donations. We focus on soft money and 527 Committee 
donations because these represent a direct use of corporate funds, whereas PAC 
and individual donations come from individuals and not the corporation. 
Moreover, in the wake of the Citizens United decision, going forward, direct 
donations of corporate funds will become much more important. Soft money and 
527 Committee donations represent historical examples of direct donations of 
corporate funds. Focusing on these funding sources makes our tests more relevant 
for future outcomes.4  
The Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) has created a comprehensive 
database based on the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filings that links all 
four types of donations (PAC, individual, soft money, and 527 groups) to the 
donor’s affiliated organization. Our donation data from 1991 to 2004 comes from 
this CRP database. These data cover donations to candidates for federal offices 
(congressional and executive) and national parties; they do not include donations 
to candidates for state level offices. Further, we do not examine lobbying 
expenditures in this paper. The CRP reports that there is little correlation between 
the firms’ lobbying expenditures and firms’ political donations, suggesting that 
these are distinct categories for attempting to garner influence.5 
We aggregate donations of subsidiaries at the level of the parent company 
and attribute donations of acquired companies made after the acquisition was 
completed to the acquiring company. We exclude private companies and US 
subsidiaries of foreign companies, which results in a final sample of 1,381 
publicly traded companies that make donations. Over our sample period, only 
11.27% of all publicly traded firms donated to candidates for federal offices using 
corporate funds. 
 
                                                 
4 See also Coates (2010). 
5 See also Yu and Yu (2010). 
6
Business and Politics, Vol. 14 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 5/2/12 5:08 AM
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Corporate Political Donations 
Panel A: Corporate Political Donations: 1991 – 2004 
This panel shows the dollar value of corporate political donations (in millions) at 
the federal level for the entire sample period and for each sample year. The 
donation data is obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). “PAC 
Donations” are corporate donations to political action committees, and are also 
called hard money donations. “Soft Money Donations” are corporate 
contributions made outside the federal contribution limits to the national parties or 
outside interest groups. “Individual Money Donations” are limited, regulated 
contributions made by an individual affiliated with a corporation to a candidate’s 
campaign committee, a PAC, or a political party. “Donations to 527 Committees” 
are corporate donations to tax-exempt groups organized under section 527 of the 
Internal Revenue Code to raise money for political activities including voter 
mobilization efforts, issue advocacy, etc. Median donations are conditional on 

















Total 12105 1421.234 604.935 504.953 290.721 20.630 
Mean 12105 0.117 0.050 0.042 0.024 0.002 
Median 12105 0.028 0.023 0.029 0.008 0.003 
1991 708 44.126 26.952 8.588 8.587 0.000 
1992 818 82.470 45.542 20.641 16.286 0.000 
1993 758 43.054 25.565 10.300 7.182 0.000 
1994 888 75.961 44.388 18.286 13.287 0.000 
1995 880 71.489 29.928 27.772 13.739 0.000 
1996 1205 133.100 49.496 64.363 19.241 0.000 
1997 875 72.027 31.591 29.101 11.330 0.000 
1998 934 114.400 48.300 49.813 16.285 0.000 
1999 880 105.484 36.367 42.700 26.415 0.000 
2000 1011 192.141 53.470 104.470 34.199 0.000 
2001 867 106.214 38.801 53.483 13.894 0.000 
2002 863 152.574 57.818 75.434 19.275 .0525 
2003 780 88.148 49.196 0.000 34.855 4.096 
2004 818 140.103 67.519 0.000 56.103 16.481 
 
Table 1, Panel A displays the total donations as well as the four categories 
of political donations by year and shows that for our sample, PAC, soft money, 
527 donations, and individual accounted for 42.6%, 35.5%, 1.5%, and 20.5% of 
total donations, respectively. Throughout this study, all donations are expressed in 
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2004 dollars. Panel B shows donations aggregated at the industry level for 
financial trading, telecommunication, utilities, banking, and transportation, the 
five industries that donated the most money during our sample period based on 
the Fama-French (1997) 49 industry classification. Both panels show an election 
year effect: donation levels are higher in even years that correspond to 
congressional and presidential elections. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Corporate Political Donations 
Panel B: Top Five Donating Industries 
The top five industries ranked according to the total dollar value of industry 
national level political donations (in millions) from 1991 through 2004. The 
industries are defined according to the Fama-French 49 industry classification.  
Year Fin.  Trad. Telecomm Utilities Banking Transportation 
1991-
2004 
226.361 110.288 99.905 80.637 76.365 
1991 8.178 2.229 2.765 1.830 2.217 
1992 15.754 3.899 4.596 3.160 3.154 
1993 7.734 2.869 2.977 1.336 2.301 
1994 12.892 5.176 4.709 2.228 3.321 
1995 11.551 6.468 4.532 2.467 3.668 
1996 22.379 9.418 8.265 4.707 7.604 
1997 13.959 4.953 5.504 3.125 3.368 
1998 20.492 8.450 7.986 5.686 6.101 
1999 18.841 9.294 8.341 4.969 7.390 
2000 28.277 17.357 14.081 10.312 10.248 
2001 12.834 9.643 8.991 9.302 7.287 
2002 18.824 16.276 12.766 11.455 8.388 
2003 15.863 5.830 7.019 5.359 4.992 
2004 18.783 8.426 7.372 14.701 6.325 
 
We investigate the effect of political donations in year t on future stock 
returns in year t + 1. If year t is an election year, we expect a portion of the future 
annual stock return associated with political donations in this year to be driven by 
the announcement effect of the election outcome. To capture this announcement 
return, we calculate the annual return variable as the buy-and-hold return from the 
first Wednesday of November until the first Monday of November the following 
year. For example, we associate the 2001 (year t+1) return (calculated from 
Wednesday, Nov. 8, 2000 until Monday, Nov. 5, 2001) with all political 
donations made from January 1, 2000 until December 31, 2000 (year t). In 
election years, the vast majority of donations are made prior to the election, so the 
slight overlap in periods (between November 8 and December 31, 2000 in this 
example) is not, in practice, a problem. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
“Excess Return” is relative to the four-factor model, equal weight (EW) or value 
weight (VW). “Book/Market” is book value of equity over market value of equity. 
“ROA” is operating income after depreciation over total assets. “Sales Growth” is 
the two year average sales growth. “Free CF” is free cash flow as defined in Lehn 
and Poulsen (1989) over total assets. “Leverage” is long-term debt over total 
assets. “R&D” is R&D expenditures over total assets. “Investment” is net 
investing cash flow over total assets. “Sales Impact” is firm sales over total 
industry sales. “Assets” is book value of assets. “Target” (“Acquirer”) indicates 
whether a firm is a target (an acquirer) during the year. “Insider Own” (“Block 
Own”, “Institutional Own”) is the percentage ownership of officers and directors 
(blockholders, institutional shareholders). “Abnormal Compensation” is excess 
CEO compensation from predicted value. “Industry Frequency” is the fraction of 
firms in an industry that donate in a year. Wilcoxon-Z statistics are reported for 













Excess Return (EW) 0.028 5250 0.036 71442 -5.58*** 
Excess Return (VW) 0.003 5250 0.007 71442 -1.61 
Book/Market 0.519 5403 0.698 72200 -21.04*** 
ROA 0.083 5423 0.003 72144 33.61*** 
Sales Growth 0.187 5309 0.226 66362 -0.98 
Free CF 0.085 4749 -0.001 57563 19.95*** 
Leverage 0.224 5418 0.156 73098 34.23** 
R&D 0.018 5389 0.042 72920 -11.35*** 
Investment 0.102 5179 0.095 64571 9.43*** 
Sales Impact 0.050 5464 0.004 72857 92.66*** 
Assets 16132 5499 862 74117 97.20*** 
Target 0.068 5499 0.053 84154 2.55** 
Acquirer 0.213 5499 0.122 84154 28.40*** 
Insider Own 0.113 4088 0.207 52880 -34.16*** 
Block Own 0.285 4095 0.357 52957 -15.17*** 
Institutional Own 0.510 4094 0.284 52791 50.28*** 
Abnormal Compensation 0.028 3957 -0.008 12900 27.02*** 
Industry Frequency 0.189 5499 0.116 84154 46.67*** 
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The daily stock returns for our calculations are from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We use both the delisting information from 
the daily CRSP file and the Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database to 
identify companies that have been involved in mergers or acquisitions as either an 
acquirer or as a target. Ownership data (the fraction of shares owned by insiders, 
block holders, and institutions) comes from Compact Disclosure. The number of 
directors (board size) is calculated for all companies in our sample that are either 
covered by Compact Disclosure or by RiskMetrics. We construct an indicator 
variable that equals one if the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is also the 
Chairman of the Board (CEO Chair) for all companies for which this information 
is available through either Compact Disclosure, RiskMetrics, or Execucomp. 
Based on its four-digit Standard Industrial Classification SIC code, we assign 
each company to one of the Fama-French 49 industries. This classification is used 
to control for industry effects and calculate each firm’s sales impact, defined as 
the company’s sales scaled by the sales of all companies in the same industry, and 
industry frequency, defined as the fraction of firms in an industry that donate.  
Finally, each CEO’s abnormal compensation is calculated as the deviation 
from predicted compensation based on firm size and industry median-adjusted 
prior stock and accounting performance. All other firm characteristics are 
obtained from the CRSP/Compustat merged database. Definitions and summary 
statistics are in Table 2. As is clear from the summary statistics, there are 
important differences between donating and non-donating firms. The key 
difference for our purposes is that the mean excess future return for soft money 
and 527 Committee donating firms is 2.8% while for non-donating firms, it is 
3.6%.6 This difference is large, and we explore it throughout the rest of the paper. 
 
3. Determinants of Corporate Political Donations 
 
A. Why do Firms Chose to Donate? 
 
Firms may donate for a variety of reasons. We focus on two important ones. First, 
donations may represent a form of investment in political capital. In this view, 
firms donate because they expect the recipients of the donations (national level 
politicians and/or committees associated with the national political parties) to 
reward the donations with favorable legislation. An example of this is Altria 
Group, the parent company of Phillip Morris—the largest corporate contributor in 
our sample—which presumably has an economic interest in discouraging 
                                                 
6 Excess returns are measured relative to the four-factor model, which we describe in Section 4. 
Excess returns for the whole sample are positive because of equal-weighting. Value-weighting 
yields mean excess returns of 30 and 70 basis points for donating and non-donating firms 
respectively. For both equal weight and value weight excess returns, medians are essentially 0. 
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increased tobacco and cigarette taxes as well as in limiting government regulation 
of tobacco products.  
Second, donations may represent an agency problem. Corporate donations 
are largely unobservable to shareholders. While donations are disclosed to the 
government, they are not disclosed in firm financial statements, usually not 
discussed in board meetings, and generally small enough to evade shareholder 
scrutiny. If donations represent an agency problem, then they do not generate 
returns for shareholders. Instead, donations are a form of perquisites consumption 
for top managers. Managers may have personal preferences over candidates and 
parties they wish to support that are simply unrelated to the firm’s activities.  
To test this, we collected the individual political contributions of CEOs of 
the top 20 donating companies in our sample. Our data source for CEO 
contributions is www.campaignmoney.com. For each CEO we calculate the total 
contribution to the Democratic party (“ceodem_cycle”) and to the Republican 
party (“ceorep_cycle”) during each election cycle (2 years) in our sample. We 





We have 138 non-missing RelRep_CEO observations for the top 20 
donating companies. We then compute the same measure for each company in 
each election cycle using the company’s political contribution data. We find that 
the correlation between RelRep_CEO and RelRep_Firm is 0.75. We further 
define an indicator variable “Republican CEO” that equals one if 
RelRep_CEO>0, and another indicator variable “Republican Firm” that equals 
one if RelRep_Firm>0. We find that the correlation between “Republican CEO” 
and “Republican Firm” is 0.81. In summary, we find that a CEO’s political 
orientation is highly correlated with the firm’s political orientation. Of course, this 
evidence is only suggestive, as the CEO may donate personally in conjunction 
with the firm’s interest. 
In addition, donations may grant access to politicians. While such access 
could be valuable for the firm, it may also simply be a way for executives to 
demonstrate their own power and prestige. Such donations may pave the way for 
executives to be appointed to cabinet positions or ambassadorships. As an 
example, the CRP’s “The Bush Administration Embassy Row” project lists 40 
major ambassadorial picks who donated large amounts to the Bush campaigns and 
the Republican Party during the 2000, 2002, and 2004 election cycles. Among the 
40 large-donor ambassadors, 33 were corporate CEOs, presidents or founders, or 
their immediate family members (e.g., wife). In some cases, such political 
appointments might be beneficial for the firm. In other cases, such appointments 
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may be simply neutral or even negative for the firm, as we expect for 
ambassadorial appointments for CEOs.  
Even if donations represent an agency problem, it is difficult to identify 
the exact nature of the agency problem. Do donations represent perquisites 
consumption? Or, do they signify that top executives are busy attending to 
political issues that are peripheral to shareholders and therefore neglecting the 
firm? Perhaps donations simply reflect a propensity to squander excess cash. All 
of these are possibilities, but are hard to disentangle. Because we cannot directly 
identify the source of agency problems, we look for evidence that is consistent 
with the presence of agency problems in broader terms. We then examine whether 
agency problems or efficient investment better describe why firms make political 
donations. 
 
B. Characteristics Associated with Donations 
 
Our previous discussion makes clear that firms choose whether and how much to 
donate. What factors influence these decisions? In Table 3, we estimate donations 
as a function of a vector of firm characteristics as well as industry and year 
dummies. Year dummies are critical as Table 1 shows that donations are larger in 
even-numbered years, which correspond to national level elections, while industry 
dummies are also critical because of industry variation in donations.  
As noted before, 93.9% of our firm-year observations are donations of 0. 
In Table 3, the first column displays the results from a probit specification where 
the dependent variable, donation dummy, takes a value of 1 if the firm donates in 
that year and 0 otherwise. The second column displays the results from a Tobit 
specification where the dependent variable is the logarithm of donations. All of 
the independent variables for these specifications are measured as of the year 
prior to the donating year. Throughout, we use robust standard errors clustered by 
firm. In general, the results are quite consistent. 
Firms that donate and firms that donate more tend to have lower book-to-
market ratios, more assets, lower sales growth, more free cash flow, less leverage, 
less R&D spending, and less investment (capital expenditure) spending (in the 
probit specification). This set of characteristics implies that firms that donate are 
larger, have more cash, and are growing more slowly. Interestingly, firms that 
donate more do not seem to spend this cash on R&D or physical capital as they 
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Table 3: Characteristics of Donating Firms 
The table presents Probit and Tobit regression coefficients (not marginal effects) 
of corporate soft money and 527 Committee donations on firm characteristics. 
“Donation Dummy” equals one if a firm makes soft money or 527 Committee 
donations in that year and 0 otherwise. “Log(Donation Value)” is the logarithm of 
the dollar value of soft money and 527 Committee donations (in millions). All the 
independent variables are measured as of the year prior to the donating year. 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * 







Book/Market -0.170*** -0.026*** 
 (0.043) (0.006) 
ROA -0.118 0.061 
 (0.351) (0.052) 
Sales Growth -0.053 -0.006 
 (0.038) (0.006) 
Free CF 0.242** 0.052* 
 (0.125) (0.028) 
Leverage -0.132 -0.026 
 (0.124) (0.017) 
R&D -0.672 -0.103 
 (0.471) (0.067) 
Investment -0.062 0.006 
 (0.105) (0.015) 
Sales Impact 2.221*** 0.113** 
 (0.808) (0.051) 
Log(Assets) 0.521*** 0.073*** 
 (0.018) (0.004) 
Target -0.088** -0.018*** 
 (0.036) (0.005) 
Acquirer 0.193*** 0.020*** 
 (0.034) (0.005) 
Ind. Donation Frequency 4.273*** 0.384*** 
 (0.477) (0.076) 
Constant -5.735*** -0.797*** 
 (0.257) (0.051) 
Industry & Year  Included Included 
Observations 50426 50426 
Log pseudo-likelihood -6582 -4885 
 
13
Aggarwal et al.: Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 5/2/12 5:08 AM
 
 
This last finding is surprising in light of the fact that the firms that donate 
more have lower book-to-market ratios. If we think of the book-to-market ratio as 
the inverse of Tobin’s Q or a proxy for growth opportunities, the firms that donate 
more should be investing more and yet they do not. While these results are 
suggestive, they are certainly not conclusive. These results could be consistent 
with the view that firms that donate have a free cash flow-based agency problem. 
On the other hand, these results could also be consistent with the view that these 
firms are investing in political capital rather than R&D or physical capital. 
Investments in political capital may lead to protection against competitors, the 
awarding of contracts or subsidies from the government. 
Several other characteristics stand out as well. Firms that are large relative 
to their industries as measured by their fraction of industry sales (sales impact) 
donate more. Thus, size, both in absolute and relative terms to the industry, 
matters for donations. Firms in industries that have a high fraction of donators 
tend to donate more. Because many firms are participants in the market for 
corporate control during our sample period, we include both a target firm and an 
acquirer dummy in our specifications. Target firms are less likely to donate and 
donate less. Acquirers are more likely to donate and donate more. 
In general, we conclude that larger firms with more free cash flow and less 
conventional investment spending tend to donate more. At this stage, we do not 
claim any causal relation between these characteristics and donations. However, 
these associations are sufficiently suggestive to question whether donations are 
investments that generate better returns or symptomatic of agency problems. We 
turn to this question in the next section. 
 
4. Donations and Returns 
 
The relation between donations and firm returns could be either positive or 
negative. If donations are investments, then we expect there to be a positive 
reduced-form relation between donations and returns. If donations are 
symptomatic of an agency problem, then we expect a negative reduced-form 
relation between donations and returns. The null hypothesis is that donations and 
stock returns are unrelated, either because there is no economic relation or 
because markets correctly and fully anticipate both donations and their impact on 
stock returns. We focus on one-year stock returns because corporate political 
donations are not disclosed in a transparent or timely fashion to shareholders, and 
are likely to be capitalized into stock prices only slowly over time.  
To examine this question, we define our dependent variable, firm-level 
excess returns (XR), as one-year buy-and-hold returns minus the expected return. 
We use the four-factor model as our benchmark asset pricing model. We define 
the expected return for firm i as:  
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titititiftit MOMHMLSMBMarketrRE 4321)(    
 
where rft is the risk-free rate. The coefficients on the factors are estimated 
separately for each firm based on the prior sixty months of returns and factors. 
The excess return is then: 
 
  )( 111   ititit RERXR . 
 
We winsorize the excess returns at the top and bottom one percent. Next we 
regress excess returns on donations. The general form of our specification is: 
 
1211 )(   ititit sYearDummieDonationXR  . 
 
The first column of Table 4, Panel A contains results from an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) specification of returns on soft money and 527 Committee 
donations. Following Petersen (2009), we include year dummies and cluster the 
standard errors at the firm level. We find a negative and significant coefficient of 
-0.074 on donations.7 This coefficient implies that an incremental donation of 
$10,000 would be associated with a negative 7.4 basis point excess return. This is 
not trivial. The median donating firm has a market value of equity of $1.8 billion. 
The 7.4 basis point loss translates into a dollar loss of $1.33 million associated 
with the $10,000 soft money or 527 Committee donations. 
The above result clearly suggests that more is lost than the simple dollar 
value of the donation. Instead, we view donations as providing us with a window 
into firm value destruction, similar to the result in Yermack (2006) that finds large 
negative returns associated with the CEOs’ use of corporate aircrafts. We will 
more formally link value destruction to agency problems later in the paper. While 
the dollar loss is certainly surprising, it may also explain why 89% of publicly-
traded firms do not donate directly from corporate funds—donations are 
associated with bad outcomes for shareholders.  
                                                 
7 One concern is that this result may be driven by specific years or only a small number of years. 
To address this, we perform cross-sectional regressions year-by-year and then use the Fama-
Macbeth procedure to find time-series average coefficients and standard errors and find consistent 
results (not reported). In further robustness tests (unreported), we examine donations cumulated 
over two years and cumulative excess returns over the subsequent two years (e.g. a congressional 
election cycle), as well as donations cumulated over four years and cumulative excess returns over 
the subsequent four years (e.g. a presidential election cycle). The results are virtually identical. In 
other unreported tests, we replicate all of our results including both PAC donations and individual 
donations. The results are quite similar. Thus, whether we include or exclude PAC donations does 
not affect our results. This result is also robust to estimation using weighted least squares, where 
the weights are the market values of the firms, and also without winsorizing excess returns. 
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Because donations are substantially skewed, in all subsequent 
specifications based on the dollar value of donations, we use the logarithm of 
donations. To handle observations with no donations, we add one to each 
observation so that all observations with zero raw donations are represented by 
log (1) = 0 in the transformed observations. The second column of Table 4, Panel 
A contains the results when we replace the dollar value of donations with log 
(donations). The coefficient on log (donations), -0.111, gives us a similar 
interpretation to our previous result—a firm choosing to start donating $10,000 
would experience an 11.1 basis point reduction in excess returns. 
 
Table 4: Relation between Donations and Future Excess Returns 
Panel A: Four Factor Excess Returns 
The dependent variable is a firm’s 12-month buy-and-hold excess return using the 
four-factor model from November 1 to the following October 31. Monthly excess 
returns are cumulated over the 12-month period. “Donation” (in millions) is a 
company’s annual soft money and 527 Committee donations, and “Log 
(Donation)” is equal to the logarithm of Donation + 1 to handle zero donation 
amounts. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Four Factor Excess Return 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





















   0.028*** 0.010 
   (0.022) (0.006) 
Constant 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.007 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations 76692 76692 46497 46497 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
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As noted in the previous section, the decision of whether and how much to 
donate is clearly endogenous. Our prior specifications do not take account of this 
potential endogeneity. Because most firms choose not to donate, our first concern 
is to address a firm’s propensity to donate. Using the method of Li and Prabhala 
(2008), we estimate the following two-stage Heckman selection model: 
 
ititit uZD  1
*  ; Dit=1 if Dit*>0, and Dit=0 if Dit*≤0.  
.)( 13211   itiitit sYearDummieDXR   
 
The first equation is the probit selection equation. Z is a set of variables 
that are correlated with a firm’s propensity to donate—in this case, all of the 
variables used in Table 3, Column 1. As we noted in Table 1B, there is a clear 
industry component to donations. Our selection equation thereby includes 
industry fixed effects.  is the inverse Mills ratio computed from the selection 
equation. The second equation is the return regression including the donation 
dummy. The results of this specification are in the third column of Table 4. 
Correcting for a firm’s propensity to donate (or the private information that leads 
the firm to donate), we estimate a negative and significant coefficient on the 
donation dummy of -0.051.8 
While the probit-selection specification addresses a firm’s propensity to 
donate, it does not take into account the information contained in how much a 
firm chooses to donate (and thus may overstate the effect of donations on returns). 
Following Li and Prabhala (2008), we estimate the following two-stage 
Heckman-style Tobit selection model: 
 
ititit uZD  1
*  ; Dit= log (Dit* ) if Dit*>0, and Dit=0 if Dit*≤0.  
.)( 13211   itiitit sYearDummieDXR   
 
The first equation is the Tobit selection equation in which Z is a set of variables 
that are correlated with the amount a firm donates (Dit
*). In this case, Z is all of 
the variables used in Table 3, Column 2.  is the inverse Mills ratio computed 
from the selection equation. The second equation is the return regression 
including the amount of donations. The results from the second equation are in the 
fourth column of Panel A of Table 4. Correcting for the information in how much 
the firm chooses to donate, we estimate a negative and significant coefficient on 
donations of -0.120. 
                                                 
8 Note that this model and the following Tobit selection model are primarily identified through the 
“industry donation frequency” variable from the first stage regression. 
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As a further robustness check, we consider an alternative asset pricing 
model for our definition of excess returns. Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers (1997) [DGTW] form 125 benchmark portfolios based on market 
capitalization, book-to-market, and prior year stock return characteristics. Excess 
returns for each firm i are the difference between raw returns and the DGTW 
benchmark portfolio return: 
 
  111   ptitit RRXR . 
 
Table 4: Relation between Donations and Future Excess Returns 
Panel B: DGTW Excess Returns 
The dependent variable, excess return, is a firm’s one-year buy-and-hold return 
minus the corresponding DGTW benchmark portfolio return. Monthly excess 
returns are cumulated over the 12-month period.  The three models are those from 
Panel A.  Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 DGTW Excess Return 
















  0.021** 0.004 
  (0.008) (0.005) 
Constant 0.053*** 0.032** 0.030** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
Observations 54445 39579 39579 
Adjusted R-squared 0.002 0.01 0.01 
 
The results for the OLS and selection models using DGTW excess returns are in 
Panel B of Table 4. The results are similar, although the coefficients are 
somewhat smaller in magnitude and less significant. Thus, we do not take a stand 
on whether factors or characteristics are relevant for asset pricing and simply note 
that our results are robust to the choice of asset pricing model.  
18
Business and Politics, Vol. 14 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 5/2/12 5:08 AM
 
 
In Panel C of Table 4, we consider other specifications to further 
demonstrate the robustness of our results. One possible objection is that donations 
matter for returns only for specific industries, such as regulated industries. To 
address this, we first add industry fixed effects to the OLS specification using the 
four-factor model for excess returns in the first column of Panel C of Table 4. Our 
results are unaffected. Second, if donations matter only for industries with a high 
level of aggregate donations, then industry fixed effects may be insufficient to 
isolate an effect of donations on returns. The second column restricts our sample 
to the five largest donating industries and the results are again similar.9  
 
Table 4: Relation between Donations and Future Excess Returns 
Panel C: Additional Regression Specifications 
The dependent variable, excess return, is computed based on the four-factor 
model. “Donation” (in millions) is a company’s annual soft money and 527 
Committee donations. We add one to all donation observations before taking the 
logarithm. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
                                                 
9 In unreported results, we examine the relationship between donations and returns industry-by-
industry.  Out of the 49 Fama-French industries, 37 show a negative relation between donations 
and returns, including all five of the largest industries by dollar value of donations. Of the 37 
industries with negative coefficients, 20 are statistically significant. In none of the industries with 
positive coefficients are the coefficients statistically significant.  
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Another possibility is that the returns to donations show nonlinear or non-
monotonic effects. In particular, large donations may yield positive returns while 
small donations do not. Such an effect would be consistent with the fact that 
Altria (formerly Phillip Morris) is the largest donor in our sample, presumably 
seeking to forestall adverse tobacco legislation (although Altria also generates 
large free cash flows). To examine this possibility, we consider two nonlinear 
specifications in columns 3 and 4. 
The third column reports results from an OLS specification of excess 
returns based on the four-factor model that includes both donations and donations 
squared. The coefficient on donations, -0.087, is negative and significant, while 
the coefficient on donations squared, 0.009, is positive and insignificant. This is 
weak evidence in support of a U-shaped relation between donations and returns. 
The inflection point occurs at donations of $4.7 million, so that only companies 
donating more than $4.7 million in a single year begin to see an increase in 
returns for their marginal dollar donated. In our sample, there is only one such 
firm-year observation, suggesting that donations are unlikely to be a positive 
investment through virtually the entire distribution of our sample. 
The fourth column reports results from a spline specification, in which we 
estimate coefficients on two segments—donations below and above the median 
value of donations in the sample. We find a positive and insignificant coefficient 
on the segment below the median value of donations, while a negative and 
significant coefficient above the median value. These results are consistent with 
our previous findings.  
Our results thus far suggest a negative relation between donations and 
excess returns. However, this relation need not be causal and donations may be 
endogenous. To ascertain causality, we instrument for the firm’s level of 
donations. The specification in the fifth column of Panel C of Table 4 is: 
;)( 11 ititit vXDonationLog    
,)(ˆ 1211   ititit sYearDummieonDXR   
in which .ˆˆ 11  itit XonD   The first stage regression is used to predict the 
logarithm of donations. The instrument X in the first stage regression is the 
logarithm of a firm’s soft money political donations for the year 1992. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the firm’s soft money and 527 Committee 
donations where the dependent variable is measured from 1996 to 2004. In effect, 
we are using lagged donations as our instrument, but the lag length increases from 
four years for 1996 donations to twelve years for 2004 donations. The second 
stage regression is the excess return regression, where expected donations are 
measured in the year prior to the excess returns. The donation instrument is 
measured at least four years prior to the donation year and so, it is measured at 
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least five years prior to the excess returns. Donations from at least five years prior 
are unlikely to be correlated with current excess returns except through what they 
tell us about a firm’s propensity to donate. Statistically, instrument X is 
uncorrelated with the error term in the excess return regressions, but is positively 
correlated with current donations.10 Thus, we have plausible exogenous variation 
related to donations but unrelated to future excess returns. The fifth column 
restricts the excess return regression to those firms that have non-missing excess 
returns from 1996 to 2004. The coefficient estimate for expected (instrumented) 
donations is -0.046 and is statistically significant. These results imply that 
exogenous variation in donations is associated with negative excess returns.  
In a recent paper, Cooper, Gulen and Ovtchinnikov (2010) examine firm-
level PAC donations to US political campaigns from 1979 to 2004 and report that 
the number of politicians to whom a firm donates is positively correlated with 
future stock returns. Aside from differences in data, there are three important 
differences between our paper and their findings. Their primary variable is how 
many different candidates a firm has supported over the previous five years, not 
the dollar value of donations. We focus on the dollar value a firm has given in the 
aggregate. If donations are an investment, then the dollar value of donations 
seems to be the more appropriate measure of investing in political capital. 
Second, we focus on soft money and 527 Committee donations while they 
focus on PAC donations. As mentioned previously, PAC donations come from 
individuals associated with the firm, not directly from the firm’s funds. Because 
individuals can direct how they would like the PAC to give the money that they 
have donated, PAC donations cannot be attributed directly to the firm’s or its 
managers’ preferences. This makes inference from PAC donations challenging. 
The third difference is how they specify their asset pricing tests. In their 
primary return specifications, they use three lagged firm-specific characteristics—
ln(book-to-market), ln(market value of equity), and 12-month buy-and-hold 
returns—that correspond to the DGTW benchmark portfolios we use in Panel B 
of Table 4. While our focus is not on the best way to perform asset pricing tests, 
we note that this difference in specification partially explains the differences in 
results, as our results using the DGTW benchmark portfolios are somewhat 
weaker than our results using the four-factor model. Nevertheless, our results are 
robust to the characteristic-based asset pricing approach used in Cooper, Gulen 
and Ovtchinnikov (2010). 
  Our specifications in Table 4, coupled with the results from the previous 
section, suggest that donations are symptomatic of an agency problem. Larger 
firms with more free cash flow, and less R&D and investment spending donate 
more. Firms that donate have lower excess returns. Further, the more a firm 
                                                 
10 Tests of the validity of the instrument and the exclusion restriction are available upon request. 
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donates, the lower the excess returns. These results seem less consistent with the 
political capital hypothesis and more supportive of the agency problem 
hypothesis. However, the evidence thus far is indirect. In the next section, we turn 
to more direct tests of the agency hypothesis. 
 
5. Donations and Agency Problems 
 
A. Corporate Governance 
 
In order to examine whether donations could be reflective of agency problems, we 
ask whether mechanisms thought to constrain or exacerbate agency problems 
influence donations and subsequently, excess returns. Our perspective thus far is 
that firms with agency problems could see them manifested as having excess free 
cash flow leading to high levels of donations. The agency problems then lead to 
poor future excess returns. The donations do not cause the agency problems but 
are symptomatic of them.  
Various corporate governance variables have been shown to exacerbate or 
mitigate agency problems. For example, Yermack (1996) argues that firms with 
large board of directors seem to be ineffective in constraining agency problems. 
Thus, we include board size as a measure of board effectiveness. Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1989) argue that CEOs who are also chairman of the board are 
entrenched and therefore better able to engage or indulge in agency behavior. We 
include a dummy variable if the CEO is also chairman of the board. Abnormally 
high CEO compensation (defined as compensation minus predicted compensation 
based on firm size and industry median adjusted prior stock and accounting 
performance) is thought to be a contemporaneous indicator of agency problems.11 
In addition, three ownership variables are thought to potentially constrain agency 
behavior. Greater insider ownership provides direct incentives for managers not to 
engage in agency behavior, as well as being reflective of better managers.12 
Greater block and institutional ownerships are thought to limit agency behavior as 
block and institutional owners are more likely to be effective monitors.13 
To see whether these mechanisms influence donations, we augment our 
donation specification from Table 3 with each of the agency-controlling or 
agency-associated mechanisms. The results are in Panel A of Table 5. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of the dollar value of soft money and 527 
Committee donations. Each column adds one of the agency-controlling 
mechanisms to the original set of covariates Z. The last column includes all 
mechanisms simultaneously. Because each mechanism comes from a different 
                                                 
11 See for example, Hartzell, Ofek and Yermack (2004), and Bebchuk and Fried (2004). 
12 Hadlock (1998); Milbourn (2003); and Aggarwal and Samwick (2006). 
13 Holderness (2003). 
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data source, we have differing numbers of observations across the columns and 
also relative to Table 3.  
 
Table 5: Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Donations 
Panel A: Governance Characteristics and Donations 
This table reports OLS regressions of the logarithm of soft money and 527 
Committee donations (in millions) on governance characteristics and control 
variables. We add one to zero donation observations before taking the logarithm. 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions 
include industry and year dummies. 
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Table 5: Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Donations 
Panel B: Excess Return Regressions 
The dependent variable in all regressions is the excess return based on the four-
factor model. “Donation” (in millions) is a company’s annual soft money and 527 
Committee donations. We add one to all donation observations before taking the 
logarithm. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 




Log (Donation) -0.136***  -0.178*** 
 (0.049)  (0.056) 
Donation Dummy  -0.082 ***  
  (0.028)  
  0.050*** 0.012 
  (0.020) (0.010) 
Board Size -0.012*** -0.010*** -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
CEO Chair 0.014 0.008 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) 
Abnormal Compensation -0.044 0.013 -0.001 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Insider Own 0.036 0.048 0.049 
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.054) 
Block Own -0.001 -0.018 -0.007 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.031) 
Institutional Own -0.152*** -0.146*** -0.153*** 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) 
Constant 0.204*** 0.212*** 0.224*** 
 (0.036) (0.043) (0.043) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
Observations 9448 7268 7268 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 
The results are consistent with the agency hypothesis. Larger boards are 
associated with larger donations. Firms in which the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board have larger donations. Higher abnormal CEO compensation is 
associated with larger donations. Firms in which there is greater insider ownership 
have smaller donations in Column 4, although this relation is insignificant. Firms 
in which there is large block ownership have smaller donations. Firms in which 
there is large institutional ownership have smaller donations. In Column 7, which 
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includes all agency variables at once, the results are largely consistent, although 
only three variables - board size, whether the CEO is a chairman, and institutional 
ownership - continue to be statistically significant. Thus, to the extent that these 
corporate governance variables either exacerbate or control agency problems, they 
also seem to have the same effect on donations. 
It is also worth examining what impact these variables have on the relation 
between donations and returns. One possibility is that while donations may be 
reflective of an agency problem, this effect is entirely subsumed by corporate 
governance so that corporate governance variables are omitted factors in the 
return-donation regressions. In Panel B of Table 5, we modify the OLS and 
selection specifications from Panel A of Table 4. We add the six corporate 
governance variables (board size, CEO Chair, abnormal compensation, insider 
ownership, block ownership, and institutional ownership) to the excess return 
regression (for the selection specification, this is the second stage regression).  
In all three specifications, the coefficient on the logarithm of soft money 
and 527 Committee donations is negative and significant (-0.136, -0.082, -0.178 
respectively) and larger in absolute value than the analogous specifications in 
Panel A of Table 4. Due to the inclusion of the governance variables, the number 
of observations is greatly reduced relative to the return specifications in Panel A 
of Table 4. Once we control for governance, the negative relation between 
donations and returns is exacerbated. This suggests that corporate governance 
variables constrain agency problems and attenuate the negative donation-return 
relation. There are two potential interpretations of this. First, there are aspects of 
agency that are not captured by our governance variables and so, agency problems 
that result in donations go beyond governance control. Second, once we control 
for aspects of governance (which ameliorate or exacerbate agency problems) in 
our specifications, the negative donation-return relation is driven by something 
other than agency. We return to this possibility in Section 6.  
For now, we note that the two findings in this section—the positive 
correlation between governance variables that exacerbate agency problems and 
donations, and the negative correlation between governance variables that control 
agency problems and donations, coupled with the increase in the magnitude of the 
coefficient on donations in return-donation regressions that include governance 




                                                 
14 In unreported results, we have also examined the effect of greater disclosure (transparency) of 
political donations. We find that firms with greater disclosure of political donations have less 
negative donation-return relations, suggesting that greater transparency attenuates the negative 
effects of donations. 
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B. Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
Next, we examine the effect of corporate political donations on mergers and 
acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions are thought to be especially fraught with 
agency problems.15 Table 2 shows that donating firms are unconditionally more 
likely to be both acquirers and targets than are non-donating firms. Table 3 shows 
a strong positive association between donations and whether a firm is an acquirer 
after controlling for many other firm characteristics. Such an association is 
consistent with both donations and acquisitions being manifestations of agency 
problems.  
To explore this, we ask whether acquisitions following political donations 
are more likely to be bad for shareholders by examining cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) around acquisition announcements for donating acquirers versus 
non-donating acquirers. As a univariate comparison, the CAR from one day 
before to one day after announcement is on average -2.6 basis points (median =  
-0.2 basis points) for donating acquirers, while it is on average 158 basis points 
(median = 56 basis points) for non-donating acquirers. The difference between 
donating acquirers and non-donating acquirers is statistically significant. 
In Table 6, we present two regression specifications to control for other 
factors that influence acquisition announcement returns. The first specification 
controls for deal characteristics, while the second specification also controls for 
acquirer characteristics. In both specifications, the CAR is significantly lower for 
acquirers that made a donation in the year of or the year prior to the acquisition 
announcement. In Column 2, a donating acquirer’s CAR is 66.1 basis points 
lower than a non-donating acquirer’s, controlling for firm and deal characteristics. 
Hence, it appears that donating firms make worse acquisitions than do non-













                                                 
15 See for example, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). 
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Table 6: Donations and Acquirer Returns 
This table reports OLS regressions of acquisition announcement returns (in 
percent), CAR [-1,+1], on a donation dummy that equals one if the firm made soft 
money or 527 Committee donations to politicians in the year of, or the year 
before, the acquisition announcement. “Tobin’s Q” is market value of assets 
divided by book value of assets. “Deal Size” is the ratio of deal value over the 
acquirer’s market capitalization averaged across the transactions by the same 
acquirer in a year. Observations with Deal Size less than 1% are excluded. 
“Public Target” is the fraction of transactions in a year in which the target is a 
publicly traded company. “% of Stock” is the fraction of transaction value paid 
with stock averaged across transactions by the same acquirer in a year. “Cash 
Ratio” is the firm’s ratio of cash to total assets. Robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
 (1) (2) 
Donation Dummy -0.946*** -0.661*** 
 (0.256) (0.251) 
Deal Size 0.520 0.655* 
 (0.352) (0.384) 
Public Target -3.470*** -3.532*** 
 (0.288) (0.283) 
% of Stock -0.624* -0.355 
 (0.325) (0.326) 
Tobin’s Q  -0.437*** 
  (0.102) 
Cash Ratio  1.179 
  (0.921) 
Log(Assets)  -0.001** 
  (0.0005) 
Constant 2.398*** 2.954*** 
 (0.167) (0.235) 
Observations 6949 6653 
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.04 
 
 
6. Donations as an Investment 
 
A. Is donating to the election’s winner an investment? 
 
Using event studies around election outcomes, previous research finds that 
donating to the winning party is associated with positive stock price reactions 
while donating to the losing party is associated with negative stock price 
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reactions. An alternative explanation is that the negative returns we document 
may simply be an outgrowth of losing political bets made over the period we 
study. Had firms bet on political winners, then they would have enjoyed positive 
returns on their investments in political capital.  
To explore this possibility, we separate years into three categories — years 
with a presidential election (e.g., years evenly divisible by four), years with a 
congressional election only (e.g., years evenly divisible by two but not by four), 
and non-election years (e.g., odd-numbered years). For the two categories of 
election years, we define a dummy variable “Win” as follows. In a presidential 
election year, if donations by a firm to the party that wins the presidency exceed 
50% of total donations, then Win = 1 for that firm, and 0 otherwise. In a 
congressional election year, if donations by a firm to the party that wins net seats 
(e.g., the party’s total seats in Congress increase) exceed 50% of total donations, 
then Win = 1 for that firm, and 0 otherwise. Win is not defined for non-election 
years. 
To explore this, we ask whether acquisitions following political donations 
are more likely to be bad for shareholders by examining cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) around acquisition announcements for donating acquirers versus 
non-donating acquirers. As a univariate comparison, the CAR from one day 
before to one day after announcement is on average -2.6 basis points (median = -
0.2 basis points) for donating acquirers, while it is on average 158 basis points 
(median = 56 basis points) for non-donating acquirers. The difference between 
donating acquirers and non-donating acquirers is statistically significant.  
In Panel A of Table 7 we report several specifications to examine the 
possibility that what matters for donations as investments is donating to the 
winning party. In Columns 1, 3, and 5, we regress excess returns on the logarithm 
of soft money and 527 Committee donations for presidential election years, 
congressional election years, and non-election years, respectively. The relation 
between donations and excess returns is negative in all three cases, although 
insignificant for presidential election years. These results are consistent with our 
results from Table 4. 
In Columns 2 and 4, we add an interaction between donations and Win for 
presidential and congressional election years. The investment hypothesis predicts 
that the effect of donations should be insignificant, while the interaction of 
donations and Win should be positive and significant. For presidential elections, 
the coefficient on donations is negative and insignificant, and the coefficient on 
the interaction is positive and insignificant and smaller in absolute value than the 
coefficient on donations. For congressional elections, the coefficient on the 
interaction is positive but insignificant, while the coefficient on donations is 
negative, large in magnitude, and significant. Donating leads to large negative 
returns, while donating to the winning party does not offset the negative returns to 
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donating. For one-year excess returns there is no support for the hypothesis that 
donating to the winning party leads to better returns. Importantly, the agency 
hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on donations should be negative in these 
specifications and that the coefficient on the interaction terms should be 
insignificant, as mirrored in the finds. 
 
Table 7: Returns to Donation: Variation across Elections 
Panel A: Future Excess Returns 
This Panel shows future one-year excess returns computed based on the four-
factor model: the three Fama-French factors and the momentum factor. Panel B 
has cumulative abnormal returns where “CAR [-1, +1]” is the market-adjusted 
election announcement return from day 1 to day 2 after election day. “Donation” 
is the dollar amount of soft money and 527 Committee donations (in millions). 
“Log(Donation) to Winner” is the logarithm of the firm’s donation if and only if 
more than 50% of the firm’s soft money donation goes to the winning party, and 
zero otherwise. For a congressional election, the winning party is defined as the 
party that gains seats in the congress (the Senate and the House). Robust standard 
errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Future Excess Return 
 Presidential Congressional No Election 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log(Donation) -0.049 -0.103 -0.294*** -0.326*** -0.167** 








      
Constant 0.026*** 0.026 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.048*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Observations 21220 21220 17058 17058 38414 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
As an additional robustness test, we replicate the results from the event 
study literature mentioned before. In Panel B of Table 7, we examine cumulative 
abnormal returns from one day before to one day after presidential and 
congressional elections. Consistent with the event study literature that focuses on 
presidential elections, we find in Columns 1 and 2 that donations are positively 
associated with one-day returns in presidential elections and that this effect comes 
entirely from donating to winners. Conversely, for congressional elections, 
donations are negatively associated with one-day returns. This negative 
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association is primarily driven by donations to the losing party, where donations 
to the winning party offset the negative coefficient on donations. We can 
therefore reconcile our results with those in the event study literature—examining 
only presidential elections provides an incomplete picture of the relation between 
donations and returns. For one-day returns, there are positive returns from 
donations to the winning party in presidential and congressional elections, but 
there are negative returns from donations to the losing party in congressional 
elections.  
 
Table 7: Returns to Donation: Variation across Elections 
Panel B: Election Announcement Returns 
This Panel shows cumulative abnormal returns where “CAR [-1, +1]” is the 
market-adjusted election announcement return from day 1 to day 2 after election 
day. “Donation” is the dollar amount of soft money and 527 Committee donations 
(in millions). “Log(Donation) to Winner” is the logarithm of the firm’s donation 
if and only if more than 50% of the firm’s soft money donation goes to the 
winning party, and zero otherwise. For a congressional election, the winning party 
is defined as the party that gains seats in the congress. Robust standard errors 
clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 Election Announcement CAR[-1, +1] 
 Presidential Congressional 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(Donation) 0.019*** 0.007 -0.004 -0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Log(Donation) to Winner  0.021***  0.022** 
  (0.010)  (0.011) 
Constant -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 22390 22390 18061 18061 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
In sum, these results for one-year and one-day returns suggest that 
donating to the winning party in presidential election years has transient positive 
effects. This transient positive effect does not persist to the one-year horizon. 
Furthermore, to the extent that donating to the winning party in congressional 
elections offsets the negative effect of donations, this effect is also transient. At 
the one-year horizon, the positive effects of donations to winners entirely 
disappear. Other than for one-day returns when donating in presidential elections, 
the primary effect of donations on returns is negative. In most cases, not donating 
dominates donating, even if donating to the winning party.  
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B. Are donations a reward to politicians for past political favors? 
 
Our tests assume that firms first donate and then politicians respond with either 
favors for firms or managers. The operating assumption is that favors for firms 
should be reflected in stock returns. Another possibility is that politicians do 
favors for firms and then the firms donate to the politicians. To the extent that 
firm returns increase as a result of favors, we would miss the returns that occur 
prior to the donations. A backward-looking approach to donations, in which 
favors and returns occur prior to donations, would not be captured in our previous 
specifications. While Table 2 shows that excess returns in the year prior to the 
donation are lower for donors versus non-donors, this does not fully resolve the 
issue. While we cannot identify past political favors to firms, we can examine this 
issue indirectly by focusing on a set of firms for which it is unlikely that 
donations are a reward for past political favors.  
We examine firms that initiate donations concurrent with or immediately 
subsequent to a change in political control. To see the rationale for this test, 
consider the 1994 House and Senate elections. In that election, the Republican 
Party gained control of both the House and Senate. Now consider donors who 
started donating in 1994 or 1995 and gave the majority of their donations to 
Republican candidates. Prior to 1994, the Republican party was not in power. So, 
these donations were unlikely a reward for past political favors. Conversely, after 
1994, the Republicans were well-positioned to provide favors on a going-forward 
basis. So, when political control changes, are the returns for the firms that initiate 
donations to the winning party positive (returns to investment) or negative (no 
returns to investment)? 
We examine five specific events that correspond to all federal level 
changes of control during our sample. First, as described above, we examine firms 
that initiate donations in 1994 or 1995 and give the majority of their donations to 
the Republican candidates for House and Senate elections. This corresponds to the 
Republican party winning majority seats in Congress in 1994. Second, we 
examine firms that initiate donations in 2001 and give the majority of their 
donations to the Democratic candidates in Senate elections. This corresponds to 
the disassociation of Senator James Jeffords from the Republican Party to 
becoming independent and subsequently voting for Democratic control of the 
Senate. Third, we examine firms that initiate donations in 2002 or 2003 and give 
the majority of their donations to the Republican candidates for Senate elections. 
This corresponds to the Republicans winning majority Senate control in 2002. 
Fourth, we examine firms that initiate donations in 1992 or 1993 and give the 
majority of their donations to the Democratic presidential candidates (Bill Clinton 
and all of his Democratic primary opponents). This corresponds to President 
Clinton winning the presidency in 1992. Fifth, we examine firms that initiate 
31
Aggarwal et al.: Corporate Political Donations: Investment or Agency?
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
Brought to you by | University of Kansas Libraries (University of Kansas Libraries)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 5/2/12 5:08 AM
 
 
donations in 2000 or 2001 and give the majority of their donations to the 
Republican candidates for president (George W. Bush and all of his Republican 
primary opponents). This corresponds to President Bush winning the presidency 
in 2000. We assign a treatment dummy equal to one for all firm-year observations 
that meet the above criteria.  
 
Table 8: Are Donations a Response to Past Political Favors? 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
The “Treatment Dummy” is an indicator that equals one if a firm initiates soft 
money or 527 Committee donations, and gives more than 50% of its soft money 
and 527 Committee donations to the political party that enters power in that year. 
 
 Mean Excess Return # of Observations 
Treatment group -0.024 176 
Donation initiators not in the 
treatment group 
-0.010 270 
Non-initiating Donors 0.031 4804 
Non-donors 0.036 71442 
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
The dependent variable in each regression is the future excess return. “Donation” 
is the dollar amount of soft money and 527 Committee donations (in millions). 
Robust standard errors clustered by firm are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) 
Treatment Dummy -0.102** -0.099** 
 (0.041) (0.041) 
Log(Donation)  -0.107*** 
  (0.040) 
Constant 0.031** 0.032*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
Year Dummies Included Included 
Observations 76692 76692 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 
 
Table 8, Panel A provides summary statistics for the treatment and several 
other groups. Mean excess annual returns relative to the four-factor model for the 
treatment group are -24 basis points and there are 176 firm-year observations that 
meet the criteria above. We also report mean excess returns for firms that initiated 
donations in the treatment years, but gave the majority of their donations to the 
other political party. In addition, we have mean excess returns for firms that had 
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previously donated and mean excess returns to non-donors. In all cases, the excess 
returns are for the year following the donations. Excess returns for first-time 
donors to a party that wins control are lower than excess returns for first-time 
donors to the losing party, which in turn are lower than excess returns to existing 
donors. Excess returns to all categories of donors are lower than excess returns for 
non-donors. These results are exactly the opposite of what we would expect if 
donations were an investment in political capital.  
Table 8, Panel B, demonstrates these results in a regression. The negative 
and significant coefficient on the treatment dummy in Column 1 shows that 
excess returns are lower for firms that initiate donations to the party that wins 
control. For these firms, it is implausible that their donations are in response to 
past political favors, since the party to which they donate was not in power. When 
we add the logarithm of donations in Column 2, we find—consistent with our 
previous results—that donations are negatively associated with future excess 
returns. In addition, excess returns are still lower for firms that initiate donations 
to the party that wins control, suggesting that these donations are unlikely to be an 
investment in political capital. In light of our agency results before, it is more 
plausible that political donations are seeking favors for managers rather than 
firms. 
 
C. Would returns be worse without donations? 
 
While the evidence is consistent with the agency hypothesis, it is possible 
donations do represent a positive net present value investment for some firms. 
Because we do not observe the state of the world in which donating firms do not 
donate, we cannot tell if the relation between donations and returns is causal. If 
the firms had not donated, it is possible that their returns would have been even 
worse.  
To address this possibility, we utilize the propensity matching method. In 
the first stage, we run the Probit regression as in Table 3, Column 1, to obtain the 
predicted probability of a firm being a soft money and 527 Committee donor. This 
Probit model includes firm-specific characteristics (firm size, return on assets, the 
book-to-market ratio, sales growth, free cash flow, leverage, etc.) as well as 
industry and time effects that are related to corporate political donations. We 
generate the predicted propensity to donate, PSCORE, for each firm-year in the 
sample. PSCORE summarizes the cost-benefit tradeoff of donating for a firm in a 
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Table 9: Matching on Propensity to Donate 
We run the Probit regression in Table 3, Column 1, to obtain the predicted 
probability of a firm being a soft money and/or 527 Committee donor. We 
generate the predicted propensity to donate, PSCORE, for each firm in the 
sample. For each donating firm in each year, we find the non-donating firm with 
the closest PSCORE in the same year. Panel A shows the summary statistics of 
PSCORE across the donating firms and the matched non-donating firms. Panel B 
shows the summary statistics of four factor excess returns across the two groups 
of firms.  
 
Each year, for all individual donating firms, we find the non-donating 
firms with the closest PSCORE in the same year, excluding firm-year 
observations with PSCOREs falling outside the common range across the two 
samples. This means that we find a matching firm that was subject to a very 
similar cost-benefit tradeoff of donating, but chose not to donate. Thus, the 
matching firm serves as the counterfactual. The matching process generates 3,870 
firm-year observations of donating firms and 3,870 firm-year observations of 
propensity-matched, non-donating firms. Table 9, Panel A shows the summary 
statistics of PSCORE across the donating firms and the matched non-donating 
firms. The distributions are similar.  
In the final stage, we compare the excess returns of the two samples. Table 
9, Panel B shows that donating firms on average experience an excess return that 
is 2.8% lower than the propensity-matched non-donating firms’ excess return. The 
median excess return for the donating sample is -2.63% lower than the 
propensity-matched, non-donating firms. Both the T-test and Wilcoxon Z-test 
show that the difference between the two samples is statistically significant. This 
result suggests that firms that make soft money and 527 Committee donations 
 Panel A: Summary Statistics of 
Propensity to Donate 
 
Panel B: Summary Statistics of 
Excess Returns 
 PSCORE Four Factor Excess Return 






Mean 0.471 0.472 0.036 0.064 
Median 0.468 0.469 -0.026 0.0003 
Std. Dev. 0.293 0.293 0.531 0.467 
Observations 3870 3870 3870 3870 
 T-test for equality of PSCORE:  
p-value=0.91 
T-test for equality of excess 
returns: p-value=0.003 
 Wilcoxon Z-test for equality of 
PSCORE: p-value=0.89 
Wilcoxon Z-test for equality of 
excess returns: p-value=0.0006 
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tend to substantially underperform relative to similar firms that do not engage in 
such activity. To the extent that firm characteristics accurately summarize the 
cost-benefit tradeoff of donating, these results mitigate the concern that donating 
firms would have performed even worse had they not donated. 
  
D. Donations and government contracts 
 
As another test, we examine the relationship between donations and industries 
that rely heavily on government contracts. We hypothesize that, for firms in 
industries in which government purchases are a large fraction of firm revenues, 
political donations are more likely to be an investment in political capital16 and 
that returns are positively associated with donations.  
In order to test this hypothesis, we gather data on the percentage of sales 
to federal, state, and local governments for 1,172 industry groups from the 2002 
Economic Census (details available upon request). We assign to each company in 
our sample the company’s industry level of sales to the government. In effect, we 
are assigning an industry fixed effect to the firms in our sample, albeit at a very 
high level of disaggregation with 1,172 industry classifications. We regress one-
year excess returns on donations excluding individual donations, industry sales to 
the government, and the interaction of donations and industry sales to the 
government. The hypothesis is that the coefficient on the interaction of donations 
and industry sales should be positive. In other words, in industries in which 
government contracts matter to firm revenues, the returns to donating are positive. 
For donations, we report results for both a dummy variable, if the firm donates, as 
well as the dollar amount a firm donates. 
The results are in Table 10. Columns 1 and 3 report results from a baseline 
regression of excess returns on donations and sales to the government. Consistent 
with our prior results, the relation between donations and returns is negative. 
Firms in industries that derive a higher fraction of total revenues from sales to 
government have higher excess returns. In Columns 2 and 4, we add the 
interaction of donations with industry sales to the government. In neither case is 
the coefficient on the interaction term positive. These results suggest that firms in 
industries with a large fraction of sales to the government do not earn higher 






                                                 
16 Agrawal and Knoeber (2001). 
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Table 10: Government Contracts and Returns to Donations 
The dependent variable is one-year excess returns based on the four-factor model. 
Data on the fraction of industry sales to the government (“Sales to Government”) 
are taken from the 2002 Economic Census. “Donation” is either the dollar amount 
of soft money and 527 Committee donations or a dummy variable for whether the 
firm makes such donations at all. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are 
reported in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Donation (dummy) -0.037*** -0.036**   
 (0.016) (0.018)   
Log (Donation)   -0.267** -0.274** 
   (0.148) (0.180) 
Sales to Government 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.043 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.051) (0.052) 




Constant 0.029 0.029 0.027 0.026 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Observations 10982 10982 10982 10982 





Our results suggest that corporate political donations in the US are reflective of 
agency problems. We find that firms that donate directly out of corporate funds 
are larger, have more free cash flow, and have lower R&D and investment 
spending. We also find that donations are negatively correlated with future excess 
returns. An increase in donations of $10,000 is associated with a reduction in 
excess returns of 7.4 basis points. Worse corporate governance is associated with 
larger donations. Worse governance characteristics explain part but not all of the 
negative return-donation relation. Furthermore, firms that make political 
donations are more likely to engage in acquisitions than firms that do not make 
donations. In addition, donating firms engage in worse acquisitions than firms that 
do not donate, as measured by cumulative abnormal announcement returns.  
Our findings are consistent with the fact that shareholders are taking an 
increased interest in political donations. According to the Center for Political 
Accountability (see www.politicalaccountability.net), “73% [of surveyed 
shareholders] agreed that corporate political spending is often undertaken to 
advance the private political interests of corporate executives rather than the 
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company's interest.” According to Guerrera (2007), “investors argue that public 
disclosure and board oversight [are] essential to ensure that executives do not use 
corporate money to help political allies or channel funds to politicians whose 
agendas contravene company policies.” Our results support the view that lack of 
transparency allows donations to function as a form of private benefits for 
managers. Our findings may shed light on why 89% of the publicly traded firms 
in the US make no political donations out of corporate funds at all during our 
entire sample period — shareholders are unlikely to benefit from such donations. 
This perspective may be particularly useful in light of the Citizens United ruling 
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